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Abstract
The article introduces the theoretical foundations of the author’s original concept of accounting engineering. 
We assume a theoretical premise whereby accounting engineering is understood as a system of accounting 
practice utilising differences in economic events resultant from the use of divergent accounting methods. Unlike, 
for instance, creative or praxeological accounting, accounting engineering is composed only, and under all 
circumstances, of lawful activities and adheres to the current regulations of the balance sheet law. The aim of 
the article is to construct a model of accounting engineering exploiting taking into account differences inherently 
present in variant accounting. These differences result in disparate financial results of identical economic events. 
Given the fact that regardless of which variant is used in accounting, all settlements are eventually equal to one 
another, a new class of differences emerges - the accounting engineering potential. It is transferred to subsequent 
reporting (balance sheet) periods. In the end, the profit “made” in a given period reduces the financial result of 
future periods. This effect is due to the “transfer” of costs from one period to another. Such actions may have 
sundry consequences and are especially dangerous whenever many individuals are concerned with the profit of 
a given company, e.g. on a stock exchange. The reverse may be observed when a company is privatised and its 
value is being intentionally reduced by a controlled recording of accounting provisions, depending on the degree to 
which they are justified. The reduction of a company’s goodwill in Balcerowicz’s model of no-tender privatisation 
allows to justify the low value of the purchased company. These are only some of many manifestations of variant 
accounting which accounting engineering employs. A theoretical model of the latter is presented in this article.
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Introduction
Using different accounting methods to affect financial reporting has been widely acknowledged 
by modern conceptions of earnings management for a long time. This approach has been rec-
ognized both theoretically, as a hypothetical possibility, and practically, in a form of accounting 
practice known as creative accounting.
The basic concern in any analysis of accounting engineering is to define this notion and, even more 
importantly, show it to be conceptually different from creative and praxeological accounting.
Accounting engineering is understood to comprise only lawful activities conforming to the 
current balance sheet law to the letter, which is what sets it apart form creative accounting. Ac-
counting engineering is a method of managing company resources in such a way as to ensure 
that the effects of economic operations are in concordance with assumed goals. Thus, account-
ing engineering defines the degree of correlation between accounting operations and company 
1  Dr Leszek Michalczyk, adiunkt, Politechnika Krakowska, ul. Warszawska 24, 31-155 Kraków, Instytut Ekono-
mii, Socjologii i Filozofii, e-mail: 50sas21@wp.pl.38
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management (“the managerial aspect of accounting”). In this last aspect, accounting engineer-
ing exploits the fact that accounting operations may be antedated. In the present article, we 
describe the mechanics behind this form of accounting practice.
Variant accounting is yet another term begging explanation. Variant accounting covers variant 
(alternative and optional)2 solutions in the balance sheet law (also in Poland). Such solutions are 
characterized by different “vestigial” financial results of identical economic operations.  This 
leeway given by the balance sheet law has some important consequences:
1. an accounting method may be used to control a company’s current financial results. This 
particular “accounting instrument” plays a crucial role in accounting engineering,
2. the solution has considerable consequences, since the accounted value will remain the 
same, no matter which accounting method has been chosen. This follows from the fact 
that, regardless of the selected accounting method, each fixed asset will be amortized 
“down to zero” and each product will also be outlaid at sale or consumption “down to 
zero” in the books of warehouse management.
The above fact has important implications not only for current “operating” earnings management 
in a company, but also for its valuation in the future. If accounting engineering solutions were em-
ployed in a given reporting period to increase the financial result recorded in the balance sheet, costs 
would need to be transferred to the next period, e.g. by amortising the fixed assets with smaller cur-
rent depreciation values (e.g. the declining method). As such, the financial result would, in future 
periods, be reduced by the amount of the values transferred from previous periods.
In the present article, we describe the mechanics behind accounting engineering.
Overview of research into the procedures of accounting engineering
Previous studies concerning the nature of accounting engineering as an accounting model have 
considered:
1. its relation to the theory of sciences in view of General Systems Theory,
2. analyses differentiating between accounting engineering and other models of account-
ing, such as creative and praxeological accounting (Michalczyk, 2011),
3. ethical implications for accountants using accounting engineering solutions,
4. legality (in terms of criminal, penal and fiscal law) of accounting engineering operations 
and the equivocal legal status of accounting fraud,
5. the degree to which it conforms with the balance sheet law,
6.  using the procedures of regular accounting as a basis for accounting engineering activities,
7.  detecting types of activity associated with accounting engineering using statistical analysis.
The theoretical framework for creative accounting and accounting engineering finds its roots in 
English and American research. Numerous studies have indentified instances of accounting prac-
tice encompassing so-called financial shenanigans with creative accounting. The analyses so far 
have assumed two directions: defining the goal and finding out how to attain it. Some classical 
studies in the field J. Briloff”s (1972), M. Schillit’s (1993), R. Parker’s (1995, p. 197 and nexts), 
J. Griffiths’s (1986, 1995), or B. and J. Elliot’s (2000) defined practical manifestations of creative 
accounting as early as in the 1970s. Although standards such as UK GAAP and US GAAP do not 
directly correlate with “continental accounting” based on IAS/IFRS – or the Balance Law and 
2  This distinction has been established in accordance with the following logic: 1/ „alternative” entails a choice 
between two possible variants, 2/ if there are more than two variants, the word „option” is used, 3/ every choice 
constitutes a variant.39
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KSR (Domestic Accounting Standards), which regulate accounting practice in Poland - they may 
at least be used to compare the research into accounting engineering in its various forms.
The definition of creative accounting is due to M. Schillit (1993, p.1), who applies this term to 
such instances of accounting practice whose overarching goal is to “distort the actual perfor-
mance or financial situation of a company.”
Here we perceive accounting engineering as the paradigm of the modern accounting practice. 
Accounting engineering integrates accounting theory with economic goals of company man-
agement. This relationship is that of mutual dependence, with company goals and pursuit there-
of playing a dominant role. Accounting engineering is an instrument (“a catalyst”) which makes 
it possible to evidence such financial results as are expected by the managing board.
The theoretical foundations of accounting engineering are a combination of the following:
1. kuhn’s post-constructivist anti-cumulativism - to the extent to which it establishes a theo-
retical basis for observation and refutes the idea that science is merely a system for col-
lecting knowledge,
2. general systems theory (in: Michalczyk, 2011) - its theory of sciences and the logic of 
argumentation based on the principles of causality,
3. earnings management - to the extent it combines accounting and company management,
4. agency theory and the theory of transaction costs - as far as management and organiza-
tional sciences are concerned,
5. prospect theory - as far as defining key concepts used for describing, classifying and 
measuring values is concerned,
6. detailed accounting theory - as a basis for analysis within the variant accounting frame-
work, as well as the analysis of earnings and outgoings flow,
7. the notions of accountability and responsibility - to determine who is responsible for the 
quality of information generated by means of variant accounting.
According to the concept of anti-cumulativism, it is possible to redefine the paradigm of ac-
counting. A conceptual neologism is considered to be acceptable provided that it is justified 
by economic practice. General Systems Theory is one of the theoretical components allowing 
accounting engineering to define the correlation between accounting and the surrounding en-
vironment. The concept of earnings management constitutes “part” of an approach consistent 
with accounting engineering. Previous research into accounting engineering has shown that the 
subjects under study often behave in ways described in the theories of transaction costs, behav-
ioural finance, and Prospect Theory (in: Michalczyk, 2011).
In light of the above, accounting engineering is no more unethical than the balance sheet law. 
The balance sheet law is a codified section of accounting theory and has been created by people 
specializing in the theoretical aspect of the field. And so, if accounting engineering were in any 
way unethical, it would be due to the unethical character of the codified accounting theory.
Notions of economic truth and economic facts in financial reporting 
following the concept of variant accounting
Truth, understood as a description of facts (including the economic performance of a company in 
a given reporting period), is a matter of ethics. Ethics, in turn, is a branch of philosophy. Accord-
ing to Emanuel Kant, it is the intention behind an action that determines its ethical value, regard-
less of what its effects may be. Friedrich Nietzsche, on the other hand, insisted that only actions 
are valuable, while noble intentions and effects are immaterial. The notion of truth is also reflected 40
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in the law, customs underpinning a given economy, as well as in the attitudes of key economic 
players. If accountability, as Y. Ijiri (2004, p. IX) insists, refers to an account-giving relationship 
between two parties, it is extremely important that it be settled, or regulated, legally.
A. Kamela-Sowińska puts forward a thesis about a tripartite “descent” of creative accounting3. 
Her observations may be applied to accounting engineering as well. The human nature, legal 
regulations and the incompetence (and general laziness4) of some auditors (especially the ones 
employed in auditing firms5) all produce certain attitudes and types of activity herein classified 
as accounting engineering.
However, assuming that the premise about “human nature” is correct, it should become a matter 
of utmost importance to ensure the quality of the legal regulations “co-produced” by accounting 
theoreticians. This is because the said premise entails that people will exploit all legal loopholes 
and flaws to maximise their own profit. As a source of opinion and advice, accounting theory 
and accounting theorists play a crucial role in this field of knowledge.
Variant accounting stands in conflict with the original character of accounting understood as 
a system recording economic facts. Given their philosophical (ontological and semantic) and 
conceptual background, facts do not leave much room in terms of possibilities. So whenever a 
variant approach is used, its effects cannot be understood to describe facts. Yet another conse-
quence is that variant accounting violates the basic (ethical) function of accounting, namely – to 
protect economic circulation. This function constitutes the raison d’être of accounting as such, 
and we refer to it on numerous occasions throughout the article. That this function has been ne-
glected is thanks to accounting theorists. Variant accounting is a product of many generations of 
accounting theorists, and practicing accountants have had only minimal influence on its shape.
In its entirety, the Polish balance sheet law lacks precision and opens way to many variant solu-
tions, even if there occur discrepancies in the descriptions of the same economic event. Still, 
recording the performance of a business entity (its financial result) is considered to be the basic 
responsibility of accounting. Therefore, if we follow what Kamela-Sowińska proposes, we will 
need to introduce a component which would identify which approaches are consistent with 
accounting engineering. This component is realized in the fact that the legislators codifying 
theoretical models of accounting are ignorant of the ramifications of their actions.
This usually happens in a situation where various solutions are applied to economic events and 
processes of a single type so that different “numerical results” are achieved. Although the above 
scenario is preferred, the choice is ultimately up to the individual.
3  Also the definition of „creative accounting” proposed by Kamela-Sowińska corresponds to a considerable extent 
to accounting engineering.
4  This is, among other things, due to the regulations set by professional standards – cf. Professional norms for 
comptrollers, KIBR, Warsaw, 2005. The 1st one of those norms allows comptrollers to choose and consider only 
those sections of the balance sheet that they deem to be significant. Because of this fact, and the rule that comptrol-
lers should be changed at least every three years (especially in state-owned companies), comptrollers are usually 
not familiar with the specifics of the company they audit for the first time.
5  Some interesting remarks on the quality of work of comptrollers and the relation between different auditing 
methods and work results W. Gabrusewicz’s (2007, p. 98) The author refers to the research in the doctoral disser-
tation: M. Siekierczak, Badanie wyrywkowe w rewizji finansowej a wiarygodnośc sprawozdań finansowych (AE 
Poznań): „The tax office found that the largest number of mistakes were made [here: after the audit by certified 
comptrollers - LM] in those companies whose financial statements had been audited using the method of deliberate 
choice [i.e. the least time-consuming one] (Ibidem, p. 98). The author also notes that auditing was more defective 
when conducted by large auditing companies.41
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Attempts by theorists to pin the blame on practicing accountants for the effects of using the bal-
ance sheet law hark back to the Roman principle of casu consulto6. A similar tendency may be 
observed in “lumping” all actions of practicing accountants together under the umbrella term 
“accounting fraud”.
Many concepts that are to be implemented in practice are typically based on solutions previ-
ously applied in other countries and outlined in studies presupposing an economic and social 
reality different from that of Poland. The more elements specific to a given economic and legal 
reality are embedded in a theoretical concept, the less justified it is to implement it domesti-
cally. Since legal systems and regulations differ from country to country, applying a theoretical 
framework found in one country to another is extremely inappropriate.
The ethics of accounting is closely associated with the notion of responsibility in business, as 
well. Responsibilities of a business derive from the obligations it has towards the social and 
natural environments7. This notion is rooted in the Ancient Roman law, which has been the 
cultural foundation of Europe and America. In the economy of today, this old custom shines 
through some aspects of the free market economy and is visible in the “capitalist approach.” 
“Obligation” is a term characteristically associated with the notion of responsibility. Any obli-
gation entails the existence of “a debt” and “a responsibility”8.
Apart from its legal and cultural associations, the notion of responsibility has ethical overtones, 
too. Essentially, the ethics of a capitalist economy comes down to a “PR code of ethics.” 
This is apparent in the fact that profit maximisation is put before (Friedman, 1979) the moral 
responsibility for the means used to achieve it.
Speaking of ethics in a capitalist economy is usually just a “marketing trick.” Ethics can be subdivid-
ed into “normative ethics”, “ethics of behaviour”, and “ethics of actions.” Capitalism is an attitude of 
economic cooperation which has at its center an equation the result of which is zero. In this equation, 
“someone’s” profit causes “someone else’s” loss - and the sum is always zero. The only exception to 
this rule is the synergetic effect achieved within some organizations. Whether “ethics of behaviour” 
or “ethics of action” exist in capitalism, particularly in its liberal form, is a largely disputable mat-
ter and a purely theoretical concern. As for “normative ethics”, which has no connection to “ethics 
of behaviour” or “ethics of action”, it is merely “empty talk.” The notion of “capitalist ethics” has 
therefore no practical reflection in the capitalist economic reality since it is ideologically inconsistent 
with it. Speaking of “the ethics of capitalist liberalism in the economy” is internally contradictory.
An inherent part of modern capitalism’s dominance of profit over conscience (Michalczyk, 2011, 
p. 7-16) is globalism, in which all forms of totalitarianism – philosophical (antiquity), religious (the 
Middle Ages), artistic (Renaissance), scientific (Enlightenment), and, finally, political (19th - 
6  Lat. : accidentally, on purpose – „to do something so that it looks like an accident.”
7 The category of social and natural environment has a wider scope that that of a company’s economic environ-
ment. For example L. H. Radebaugh and S J. Gray (1995, p.44) distinguish twelve components of the environ-
ment which affect accounting systems in various countries. Namely: (1) the political system, (2) trade unions, (3) 
ownership of means of production, (4) financial markets, (5) culture, (6) the legal system, (7) the tax system, (8) 
actual and potential level of economic development, (9) religion, (10) inflation, (11) level of education regarding 
accounting and the balance sheet law, (12) social conditions.
8 Historically and legally speaking, an obligatio initially entailed the debtor’s personal liability (including Lex 
Poetelia which committed the debtor to temporary or permanent slavery for newly taken or unpaid loans), and - in 
a later time - property accountability. However, in ancient Rome the regulation was not always observed. An ob-
ligatio did not carry „liability” in the case of some natural obligations (i.e. the obligations resulting from personal 
citizenship of the debtor or that of his patron.) Still, even natural obligations could have certain consequences for 
the debtor when unfulfilled (imprisonment, usually death.) (in.: Rozwadowski, 1992, p. 143).42
Financial Internet Quarterly „e-Finanse” 2012, vol. 8, nr 3
www.e-finanse.com
University of Information Technology and Management
Sucharskiego 2,
35-225 Rzeszów
20th c.) - have been replaced by an economic totalitarianism. At the same time, certain notions are 
being redefined, and the Protestant idea of “business” starts to be identified with “ethical values” 
– once the process is complete, “capitalist ethics” will become a coherent notion. However, for the 
time being, a non-capitalist perspective which sees ethics as “a general kind of goodness” and busi-
ness as “personal goodness” still predominates. In the liberalism of Milton, the two categories used 
to be synonymous, but it has not been until today, in the age of globalisation, that the philosophical 
association of “general interest” with “the sum of individual interests” has been actually applied 
in practice. One may liken the situation to that described in “Hacksley’s law” which compares the 
world to a game of chess subject to Nature’s rules, in which the opponent stays hidden, but it is al-
ways assumed that the game is played by the rules and generally fair. At the same time, our opponent 
will pay careful attention to each mistake we make and use them to achieve his own goals.
It is precisely in the sense of “capitalist responsibility”, based on the economic equation the result 
of which is zero, that current accounting practice may and should be studied. Aside from claims 
that “all avarice is good” in its own right, a liberal notion perceiving as “acceptable” actions not 
directly forbidden by law is also prevalent (Kielecki, 2002, p. 11). These two assumptions, in 
addition to the balance sheet law, which lets variant accounting into the economic environment, 
lay ethical foundations for activities consistent with accounting engineering. The ethics rooted 
in the liberal premises of a capitalist economy states that what is in fact ethical is not the norms 
behind economic coexistence (preventing mutual harm), but whatever has not been prohibited by 
law. However, the law is not meant to shape ethical norms, but to prevent anomalous situations in 
everyday life or actions violating social and cultural taboos. Conceptually, violating a taboo is not 
exactly the same as violating an ethical norm. Apart from common law, which is largely based on 
the concept of “social revenge” (lex talionis), the law as such has therefore no direct connection 
to ethics. The law is not akin to the ethical notion of “justice”, nor does it symbolise it. There is no 
connection between the liberal approach to the law and ethics, either.
Considering its ultimate purpose – financial reporting – accounting is part of business responsibil-
ity. In this respect, the notion of responsibility entails that its components be enumerated. This 
methodology reflects what the balance sheet law sees as preferable. Those preferable solutions 
are, in turn, conceived in the “ingenious” minds of the theorists who attempt to introduce variant 
accounting to the economic domain. It is also they who are to blame for the balance sheet law’s 
poor construction in terms of accountability and responsibility. This follows from the fact that:
1. they have established how economic events and activities associated with business 
should be evaluated - this corresponds to the notion of responsibility (for one’s actions),
2. the choice of method has been left to practicing accountants, which - given that the theo-
rists see profit maximisation as the main motive behind all human actions - translates 
into the notion of accountability (for the effects of one’s actions).
Accounting theorists are thus solely responsible for the effects of accounting actions which are 
legal in the light of the law, and any attempts to label accounting engineering as “accounting 
fraud” result from the casu consulto “approach”.
External auditing plays an important part, too. Since comptrollers may be a considerable hin-
drance to creative accounting (accounting fraud), they should be recognised as an integral and 
crucial component of our country’s economy. Accounting audit counteracts unlawful business 
activities and, by definition, serves to the best interest of the addressees of financial statements 
(if properly executed) by ensuring that the delivered information is reliable.
However, the verification of financial statements is limited to controlling the correct use of an 
accounting method, but does check whether proper “accounting thinking” takes place. Since 
companies are allowed to choose from a range of legally-acceptable variant accounting meth-43
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ods, which record identical economic events in different ways, the reliability of thus created 
financial statements is highly ambiguous.
This situation is, however, not attributable to accounting auditors and the quality of their work, but 
results from the way the Polish balance sheet regulations are constructed and the fact that there ex-
ist no mechanisms that would detect accounting engineering activities and prevent companies from 
using them. The creation of such mechanisms should become the primary goal of accounting and 
auditing in the nearest future. Accounting is a noble domain of knowledge with an immense influ-
ence on the economy, it plays a crucial role in verifying all types of economic activity and review-
ing the efficiency of company management, and if the above goals are not met, it will continue to 
lose credibility. Achieving this goal, and not creating increasingly absurd variant accounting ideas, 
should become the focus of accounting. It is for the research in this field that academic degrees and 
titles should be given. And it will only be then that universities will turn back to the original function 
of accounting - the protection of economic circulation. And then the ideas of accounting theorists 
will no longer bring pitiful smiles on the faces of the pragmatic practicing accountants.
Whenever alternative solutions permitted by the balance sheet law are exploited in the account-
ing engineering “approach”, its norms are used to “manipulate” the following: 
1. the time at which costs and revenues are recorded in a financial statement, which affects 
the result displayed in the current reporting period, the period to follow, as well as the 
company’s goodwill,
2. how balance data are identified and classified in the books, which affects the company’s 
goodwill and future cost and revenue capitalizations.
This refers mainly to costs roll-overs. Therefore, companies are responsible not only to individual 
investors, creditors, lenders, and official institutions, but also to numerous contractors tied to 
them. Although speculators (so-called market operators and creditors/lenders) take the risks inher-
ently present in capitalism, and directly proportional to prospective gains, domino effects leading 
to economic straits among contractors (including their bankruptcy) or the “new approach” to the 
providing of financial information to external bodies, mainly revenue offices, may be nation-
wide9. A socially-responsible accounting practice is, however, still the preserve of public finance. 
Besides, current regulations of the Polish law give us no reason to surmise that public responsibil-
ity of private business will be enforced otherwise than by external institutions (offices, ecologists, 
etc.). For this reason, the balance sheet plays a very important role in this respect. All the short-
comings of this law stem from the implementation of variant accounting solutions, the creation of 
which has become a means of “producing” new “scientists” and theorists of accounting.
Earnings management as a variant of accounting engineering
The process of controlling the way incomes and profits are characterised, known as earnings 
management10, has been a subject of research in management and accounting since, at least, 
the 1970s. The majority of essential, classic works dealing with the scientific research into the 
9  This has also been observed in the U.S. and results in, e.g.: Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002 y., PCAOB (Public 
Company Accounting Oversight Bard). The appointment of former FBI director W.H. Webster as head of SEC is 
considered to be its sign.
10  If taken literally, this corresponds to the Polish terms zarządzanie zarobkami and zarządzanie dochodami. Ho-
wever, in Polish studies both the terms are customarily reserved for other domains of research, and so we propose 
that earnings management be translated as „zarządzanie kształtowaniem (or określaniem) dochodów i zysków” (lit. 
„controlling the way incomes and profits are characterised”). We think that this translation reflects the semantic 
content of the English term better than the literal one.44
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matter encompass publications examining accounting practices in English-speaking countries 
(mainly the United States)11.
In the 1970s, they were also defined as an opposite of “neutral” accounting evaluations of eco-
nomic operations. At the same time, it is assumed that “neutral accounting” is a possible part 
of business activity. Simultaneously, “low motives” are posited as a motivation for “controlling 
the way incomes and profits are characterised”, which K. Schipper defines as “private gain” 
(Schipper, 1989, p. 92). Similar observations have also been made by: P. Healy and J. Wahlen 
(1999)12 or P. Dechow and D. J. Skinner (2000). They contributed to the formation of the con-
cept of earnings management, as well. In Poland similar efforts have been made by: A. Jaruga, 
J. Fijałkowska, R. Papa and L. Ferreira (2004).
Each theory of earnings management has some common elements:
1. accepting possibilities resulting from the implementation of Agency Theory,
2. the maximisation of profits as a goal set before people managing a company by its stake-
holder,
3. taking into consideration possibilities resulting from variant accounting solutions,
4. accepting the existence of “low motives” behind people’s actions, which is the essence 
of the capitalist and protestant view of the economic reality.
Here the term “profit” is understood in its “general” sense. It refers to the net amount of the financial 
result which will be allocated according to the owners’ will: the money may be distributed among 
stockholders, it may be added to the equity capital (e.g. reserve capital), or used to compensate losses 
from previous years. As we can see, in its widest sense, it is an equivalent of “net profit” (including 
taxes) in accounting.  In this respect, one would also need to take into account the specifics of tax 
systems in particular countries as well as their correlation with accounting solutions.
Earnings management is used in order to influence present and potential (future) stakeholders of a 
company. According to the typology of Principles for Business. The Caux Round Table in 1994 y., 
the following should be included in this group: employees, owners and investors, contractors, cli-
ents, competitors, and national or local organizations. Research conducted so far have revealed that 
this is true as regards changes in the value of shares already listed, or to be listed, on the American 
stock exchange (in: Teoch at all, 1998, 1998, Hayn, 1995). It seems justified to presume that similar 
practices may also be observed in Polish listed companies, and not only as a result of their capitals 
being interlocked with foreign companies. They have not been included in the present article, how-
ever, since we consider IAS/IFRS regulations to be superior to our domestic balance law regulations, 
but their role as the motivation behind certain attitudes affects the accounting of other companies.
Prospect Theory, appropriately adjusted to fit the needs of accounting engineering, would take 
into account the relations with chosen elements of the economic environment of a company 
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) and a relativity-based approach. In these respects, they are ac-
cepted by the concept of accounting engineering.
However, unlike Prospect Theory and its derivative - the concept of behavioural finance13, ac-
counting engineering is essentially a mathematical approach.
11  For example: Hayn (1995); Burgstahler, Dichev (1997, p. 99-102). Those studies determined that at least 17% 
of researched subjects practiced earnings management, and the figure rose up to 40% when only the entities having 
„objective” economic problems were considered.
12  They construct, among other things, a list of „personal goals” that people in charge of company management have.
13  According to the concept of behavioural finance the negative experience of financial loss is perceived more 
strongly than the positive experience of profit of a comparable height (but, of course, with an opposite mathemati-
cal sign). What it means is that the function of profit perception is concave and of losses - convex. In greater detail 
in: (Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997; Degeorge at all, 1999; Kayn, 1995; Leuz at all, 2003).45
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What is more, the form prospect theory assumes within the framework of accounting engineer-
ing is slightly different. This alternation has to do with the connection between a company’s ac-
counting and its   operational objectives. Those objectives are associated with the maximisation 
of profits per account balance for people managing the company and for the company itself. At 
first, the objectives are pursued by maximising personal income of the manager, which in turn 
influences his attitude in pursuing the economic goals of the company. The second group entails 
“increasing” the book value (and, indirectly, the market value) of the company.
Manipulating the moment of the capitalization of costs in accounting or cost activation takes 
place in operational management. In accounting, the capitalization of costs refers to transferring 
particular assets to the result of the current reporting period. Cost activation, on the other hand, 
is responsible for characterising costs as assets.  Financially speaking, these two are deemed 
to be opposite, while in accounting, they are believed to be simply different, nonequivalent14. 
Maneuvering between these two is what accounting engineering is preoccupied with. However, 
within a longer period of time, particular elements of assets are completely settled. Even so, the 
“juggling” of costs and incomes may be done on a “permanent” basis.
As a result, accounting engineering, as an imperative of accounting operations, is primarily 
applicable to operative management. In the case of long-term management, accounting settle-
ments of particular business assets or the company’s liabilities will always be equal.  In this 
case, using different accounting methods does not matter as far as differences in financial re-
sults or net balance sheet values are concerned. Fixed assets always reach, sooner or later, zero 
net value; running costs associated with the production or provision of services, including the 
value of sold products (deferred costs) are, in the long run, always equal to total costs, irrespec-
tively of where and when they are recorded, etc.  
At the same time, current differences appearing in the financial result are impermanent.  They 
could become permanent only if the company reconstructed its assets and shifted equal sums 
between particular reporting periods. However, in a changeable capitalist economy, such an 
assumption (along with the rational basis for such actions) is questionable. Nevertheless, the 
influence of accounting methods on financial results may differ in particular periods and for that 
reason it needs to be under permanent control. Such control procedures would verify the influ-
ence of employed accounting methods on the current financial result of the company.
As regards accounting engineering operations, two groups of accounting methods may be dis-
tinguished. The first one calls for changes in the accounting policy, while the other requires no 
such alterations. While changes in the accounting policy of a company operating on the Polish 
market and based on the Polish balance sheet law must be included in the financial report as 
additional information, distinguishing, for instance, between amortisation (which has to have 
a constant value) and depreciation (which is a result of the economic operation of a particular 
fixed asset) allows the company to achieve a desirable (as seen by company management and 
company interests) net financial result.
The development of earnings management activities is a consequence of the following:
1. capital holders hire managers to manage their companies while they themselves give up 
direct and current control of the company,
2. the maximization of a company’s profits and its goodwill are taken to testify to the qual-
ity of the managers’ work, on which depend their remunerations and future employment 
in the company,
14  E.g. current depreciation value of an asset does not have to be equal to its current amortisation value.46
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3. accounting (the provider of economic information about the company) is perceived as a 
mechanism which verifies the work performed by the managers.
Since the development of accounting led to the creation of variant accounting and since managers 
are allowed to choose their accounting staff as well as define the degree to which accounting is 
used in the companies they manage, a phenomenon whereby managers “assess themselves” came 
into being. In earnings management, it is in fact the managers, and not capital holders, who decide 
whether the company functions correctly or yields accounting losses. This is made possible by 
the “achievements” in and the “development” of accounting theory, by virtue of which variant 
accounting is created. At the same time, there exist no mechanisms that would verify financial 
reports by reducing them to the “lowest common denominator.” This would be an alternative to 
the introduction of the AE factor to financial reporting (balance) of a company15.
Variant accounting led to the creation of a phenomenon whereby a necessary condition for the 
maximisation of current profits (accumulated or allocated) does not have to be for the currently 
obtained profit to be maximised. At the root of this seemingly tautological relation is research 
methodology, that of the present study included. Eradicating this phenomenon (in all account-
ing systems) should become a future objective of accounting and accounting audit.
That being so, certain links between accounting engineering and practical aspects of company 
management may be singled out:
1. managing the amount of tax liabilities,
2. managing the amount of recorded balance profit or loss,
3. managing financial liquidity via generating information for main stakeholders of a com-
pany.
The basis for such actions may be found in the classic R. H. Coase’s theory of transaction costs 
(Coase, 1937) and a theory which is in some respects compatible, and in others opposite, to the 
first one – the theory of agency16.
Agency Theory is meant to signal uncertainties existing between an economic agent and its sur-
roundings.  It is a consequence of there being no mutual trust between the owner realizing, to the let-
ter, strategic goals and individuals in charge of management, who are primarily interested in attain-
ing current, operational goals (which constitute the basis for their assessment and reward). A group 
which is an exception to this consists of business owners who operate on the stock exchange and 
who are seen by the company as parasites, obviously only after their capital has been made avail-
able. The degree of distrust should be proportional to the distance that separates, within the company 
structure, the capital holder and production factors acquired by the company17. This distance cor-
responds to the number of people managing the capital in the vertical structure of the organization.
Regardless of whether there exists, within the company, a separation of management from own-
ership (according to the model proposed by Agency Theory), or whether this fact is of no import 
15  How the AE factor functions, cf. diagrams 1 and 2.
16  These theories constitute opposite approaches to management in the economic reality of, for example, the USA.   
In the Polish environment, where directors who are capital holders and directors „from without” the company often 
„mix” within the same firm, the two concepts are complementary. In Poland, it is assumed that when a person cre-
ates a company, it is, in the first place, supposed to be his work place.  This situation has its roots in the nature of 
the social insurance system and the tax law of Poland.
17  This lack of trust is apparent in the creation of numerous corporate supervising bodies and organizations whose 
responsibility it is to control financial information generated by a company. It appears that Agency Theory’s classic 
study (Berle and Means, 1932) is also very relevant as far as the birth of modern management is concerned. Modern 
management separates business risk (owners) from business management (managers). Certain degree of control is 
also given to members of either supervisory boards taken from the „outside” or external boards of directors (which is 
common in the U.S.) (in f. e.: Peasnell at all, 2005; Beasley, 1996; Dechov and Sloan, 1996; Fama and Jensen, 1983).47
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(as in the theory of transaction costs), accounting engineering is meant to maximise the profits 
for the benefit of the people managing the company. Accounting engineering is a mechanism 
designed to attain such goals. However, if management and ownership are not separated, the 
objectives of capital holders are pursued. Their objectives are synonymous with the strategic 
goals of the company. The objectives pursued by the management may be, in turn, different 
from those of capital holders. In accounting engineering, goals appointed by people managing 
an economic unit are considered to be of primary importance. It is them that the balance sheet 
law entitles to set the scope and character of the accounting policy of their company. Empirical 
research determined that the probability of using accounting engineering against a company is 
the greater, the more it reflects the assumptions of Agency Theory.
The rationality of actions and the fact that every person tries to maximise their profits may give rise 
to the following thesis: while agency relations within a given company create favourable conditions 
for earnings management phenomena, a direct involvement of the owner in company management 
reduces a tendency to “embellish” the company’s financial results or its goodwill. In actual fact, the 
only recipients of reports for whom such “operations” may be performed are the institutions financ-
ing business or tax institutions.  In the first case, an attempt is made to increase the balance profit. 
The second case, on the other hand, entails actions aiming to decrease the value of the financial result 
regarding these balance categories which concur with the current tax law. Is is then rational to create 
a loss, especially if it can be transferred to tax settlements. This may take place in those areas where 
solutions offered by the variant balance sheet law are accepted by the tax law. A situation in which 
tax losses recorded by a company in the past are settled constitutes the only exception. It is then a ra-
tional course of action to show at least such an amount of tax profit that can be completely “levelled 
out” by tax losses, deductible in a given year (reporting period), from previous years18.
The above practices, the juggling of profits and losses, fall within the framework of accounting engi-
neering. The idea of earnings management attaches little importance and legitimacy to the creation 
of a balance loss referred to a tax loss, which demonstrates that, in view of a company’s financial 
liquidity, the idea does not offer an optimum solution.  Furthermore, earnings management does not 
take into account the need to create a balance loss in order to facilitate the takeover of one company 
by another19. Therefore, accounting engineering attaches the same value to the maximisation of prof-
its and the maximisation of both losses (the minimisation of profits) as well as the book value of a 
company. This takes place especially in connection with the implementation of settlement methods 
accepted by the tax law20 or the reduction of value of state-owned companies to be privatized21.
18  How tax losses should be settled differs from country to country. For instance, in Great Britain there are no time 
boundaries, in the U.S. tax losses have to be settled within 15 years, but, on the other hand, f. e. in France it has to 
be done within 3 years.
19  Which is what commonly happens during the privatisation of state-owned companies in Poland. Also some 
private companies resort to it when building their own capital groups. E.g. this is what ABM Solid from Tarnów 
did when it took over a private company from Dębno and some state-owned companies from Bochnia and Dębica. 
The manoeuvre known as „forcing a loss” had been used in this case.
20  Although adopting modified accounting methods to reduce taxable income is not unheard of in earnings ma-
nagement, such measures are „peripheral to the accounting solutions” advocated within the concept – with the 
exception f. e.: of J. M. Hand’s study (1992).
21  One of the consequences of reducing the book value of privatised state-owned companies is the creation of „a 
book profit” shortly after privatisation.  This is usually a result of releasing provisions and other items of balance 
costs calculated prior to privatisation, in accordance with the regulations specified in the 8th article of the Polish 
accounting act. This phenomenon also substantiates the thesis concerning the purportedly greater economic effi-
cacy and competitive power of privatised companies. Even if the thesis is indeed right, the claim that it is based 
solely on the balance data (e.g. disregarding changes in the company’s environment) is unjustifiable.48
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The research described in the present article shows that “accounting manoeuvres” aiming to 
increase or decrease the financial result of a company are dependent on management style and 
on the degree to which those activities are permitted by domestic tax regulations. It therefore 
seems appropriate to contend that the final goal of accounting engineering is not the creation 
of a virtual financial result, but the maximization of the available net circulating capital. All 
mechanisms working to this end are based on the mechanisms of variant accounting. In short, 
the idea of earnings management is one of indirect variants of accounting engineering opera-
tions. In this respect, accounting engineering is a “conceptually” wider notion.
Although earnings management has been known to exist since, at least, the 1970s, the theorists 
of accounting not only have not attempted to remedy it, but even taken actions leading to the 
development of variant accounting. As a consequence, such well-known and - reputedly - thriv-
ing companies as, inter alia, Barrings Bank or Paramalat collapsed.
Research conducted by ACEF (Association of Certifield Fraud Examiners) has shown that ap-
prox. 25% of bankruptcies of companies are a direct corollary of employees’ actions.  In this 
group, the main, as regards its overall significance, category comprises actions classified as 
white-collar crimes. Those actions make use of, among other things, variant solutions allowed 
(accepted or even affirmed) in accounting practice or crossing the boundaries of its codified 
regulations. The latter element may be said to correspond to creative accounting, while the 
former - to accounting engineering (in: www.deloite-polska.com for day: 18.08.2011, also in.: 
Michalczyk, 2005, p. 86) associate the “financial value of frauds” with the post and position 
occupied by a particular employee in a company - the higher the post, the greater the value of 
losses resulting from irregular activities. 
This relation may be accepted if the term “potentially incurred losses” is introduced, since without it, 
the approach presented by A. Hołda and W. Nowak (2003, p. 117-120) is an insubstantial allegation.
It furthermore seems justified to claim that as long as the managing board, which has the influ-
ence on the choice of methods determining both financial results and the company’s value, is 
rewarded for the visible results of those methods, there will always exist activities falling within 
the framework of accounting engineering or creative accounting. This follows from the fact that 
people who have a certain opportunity are interested to take it (motive). The scenario follows 
the pattern: motive-opportunity-action. Whether such activities are associated with accounting 
engineering or creative accounting depends on the combination of factors such as: the level of 
knowledge of accounting professionals and responsibility as volitional qualities possessed by 
individual employees in accounting and finance departments.
Similar observations were also made by international accounting organizations. It is reflected 
in the effort to create mechanisms enabling efficient corporate governance as well as separate 
systems of remunerations for individual members of the managing board. Nevertheless, espe-
cially the results of this second element appear to be foredoomed to failure. This is because such 
actions are inconsistent with the essence of private business, which makes its owns decisions 
concerning the costs of production factors (including labor), taking into consideration mar-
ket and logistical relations.  However, relating those actions solely to state-owned companies 
would have little significance given the fact that the position the sector occupies in a capitalist 
economy, in which the state is supported via direct economic activity, in weak by definition. 
The way “international committees” are composed is also questionable as such bodies consist 
mainly of theorists, while practicing accountants have little influence on the regulations deter-
mining the shape of the domestic balance sheet law.49
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Manipulating the financial result in accounting engineering
The financial result recorded via accounting engineering may be modified in a number of ways. 
In Graph 1 the financial result is represented as a function.
Graph 1: Function of financial result in accounting engineering
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components of the financial result (e, f, g, h).  
 
Individual components are added up as relative values, respectively: |e| + |f| + |g| + |h|. 
The financial result may then vary with respect to time and different reporting periods. Its 
temporary aspect is represented in Diagrams 1 and 2. 
Beginning  with  the  second  year  onward,  accounting  engineering  subsumes  the  level  of 
potential accounting engineering (pAE). Its remaining value from previous years is settled. 
The process may take one of the two forms: 
1)  "booster", 
2)  "inhibitor" (in: Michalczyk, 2011). 
Whenever the managing board considers the ultimate financial result to be unsatisfactory, its 
value is suitably adjusted using the accounting engineering index. 
Whether the value of the "pAE" index is positive or negative depends on the relation it bears 
to the company's current economic goals. Accounting engineering adjusts the financial result 
in such a way as to achieve a value closest to the target one. The overarching goal is to 
minimise  the  difference  between  the  achieved  and  expected  values.  Since  accounting 
engineering  has  to  adhere  to  double-entry  bookkeeping,  surpluses  or  deficiencies  (when 
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Where:
f (α) – goal function of a company
f (β) – actual activity function
1, 2, 3, 4,..., n – accounting engineering adjusting the financial result to company goals.
n – number of records in a company (P) with which codified variant accounting is used;
a→e; b→f; c→g; d→h – accounting methods (a, b, c, d) and their influence on individual 
components of the financial result (e, f, g, h). 
Individual components are added up as relative values, respectively: |e| + |f| + |g| + |h|.
The financial result may then vary with respect to time and different reporting periods. Its tem-
porary aspect is represented in Diagrams 1 and 2.
Beginning with the second year onward, accounting engineering subsumes the level of po-
tential accounting engineering (pAE). Its remaining value from previous years is settled. The 
process may take one of the two forms:
1. “booster”,
2. “inhibitor” (in: Michalczyk, 2011).
Whenever the managing board considers the ultimate financial result to be unsatisfactory, its 
value is suitably adjusted using the accounting engineering index.
Whether the value of the “pAE” index is positive or negative depends on the relation it bears to 
the company’s current economic goals. Accounting engineering adjusts the financial result in 
such a way as to achieve a value closest to the target one. The overarching goal is to minimise 
the difference between the achieved and expected values. Since accounting engineering has to 
adhere to double-entry bookkeeping, surpluses or deficiencies (when recorded “inversely”) are 50
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created. This amount corresponds to what we call the “pAE” value and is subject to settlement 
in later reporting periods.
Diagram 1: Influence of accounting engineering adjustments  
on the value of the financial result (first year)
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Diagram 2: Influence of accounting engineering adjustments  
on the value of the financial result (following years)
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  Diagram 2: Influence of accounting engineering adjustments on 
the value of the financial result (following years) 
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Since the number of available variants is large but countable and finite, it is possible to find a 
set of accounting procedures best suited to particular company goals.52
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Conclusions
Accounting engineering - legally accepted manipulation of the financial result by interested par-
ties - is a serious problem for the economy. By allowing for free adjustment of results, also regard-
ing identical economic events, an employer concedes to manipulation of financial results, even in 
a situation in which it affects a wide circle of stakeholders, e.g. in listed companies. This is partic-
ularly relevant whenever a profit “created” in a given period yields losses in the future. Therefore, 
whether a company will continue to be economically efficient or not is highly uncertain, even if 
other factors shaping its financial result were (in a given analysis) assumed to be constant.
This fact also bears on future research into variant accounting and its influence on financial re-
sults. It seems that the only reasonable course of action is to reduce the influence of variant ac-
counting, which is the source of the problem in a situation where the law allows for a free choice 
of accounting methods. Rejecting all “parasitic growths” and a rational blockage of new theoreti-
cal notions, as well as an effort to standardise accounting solutions, may remedy the problem of 
variant accounting, which is a serious threat to economic circulation, which should always be in 
the best interest of accounting. While achieving a “perfect degree of compatibility” of accounting 
systems is possible, albeit only in theory since each one of those systems has its own flaws, and a 
correctly executed standardization is illusory, it is feasible to reduce all accounting solutions to the 
“lowest common denominator.” This is the course that accounting, as a field of knowledge aiming 
to protect economic circulation, should take. All other actions are an unproductive and, practically 
speaking, absurd waste of time. Since the funding for such “scientists” comes from Polish taxpay-
ers’ wallets, and their actions have a detrimental effect of the domestic economy, their endeavours 
should be branded as ethically reprehensible. It needs to be noted that such actions promote and 
encourage the use of legally-accepted, but otherwise unethical, economic mechanisms advocated 
by accounting engineering theorists.
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